United States - Chile FTA Chapter 10: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter 11 Jurisprudence by Tuck, Andrew P.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 15 | Number 3 Article 5
2009
United States - Chile FTA Chapter 10: Lessons
from NAFTA Chapter 11 Jurisprudence
Andrew P. Tuck
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew P. Tuck, United States - Chile FTA Chapter 10: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter 11 Jurisprudence, 15 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 575
(2009)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol15/iss3/5
UNITED STATES-CHILE FTA CHAPTER
10: LESSONS FROM NAFTA
CHAPTER 11 JURISPRUDENCE
Andrew P. Tuck*
I. INTRODUCTIONON June 6, 2003, the United States, a decade after negotiating the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed a free
trade agreement with Chile, based upon NAFTA. 1 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, like NAFTA, the United States-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment ("Chile FTA") also provides robust protections for foreign
investors and foreign investments. Specifically, both Chapter 11 of
NAFTA2, and Chapter 10 of the Chile FTA3 deal extensively with dis-
putes between investors and the state and provide for appropriate reme-
dies, such as consultation, negotiation, and even arbitration. However,
NAFTA Chapter 11 presented many thorny legal issues that Chapter 10
of the Chile FTA attempts to resolve.
This article presents a comparative analysis of the Chile FTA Chapter
10 and NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution processes, by examining
the efficacy of Chapter 10 of the Chile FTA in the context of the "mini-
mum standard of treatment"4 and "expropriation" issues raised by Chap-
ter 11 of NAFTA.5 Since NAFTA came into effect, Chapter 11 has
produced a significant volume of litigation brought by foreign investors
against NAFTA host governments, resulting in at least twelve final deci-
*LL.M. International Trade Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College
of Law (2007); J.D., University of Miami School of Law (2005); B.A. History, Uni-
versity of Utah (2002); B.A. Spanish, University of Utah (2002). Admitted Florida,
2005. Special thanks to my wife Amy for her love and support.
1. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final_
Texts/Section Index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Chile FTA]; see
also DIRECON, General Directorate for International Economic Affairs, http://
www.direcon.cl/index.php?accion=tlceeuu.
2. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 639, ch. 11 [hereinafter NAFTA]; see also North American Free Trade
Agreement, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-3473 (West 2008).
3. See Chapter 10 Chile FTA, supra note 1.
4. See discussion infra art. 1105 of NAFTA.
5. Id. at art. 1110.
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sions.6 Among them, Metalclad v. United Mexican States,7 S.D. Myers v.
Canada,8 Pope & Talbot v. Canada,9 Loewen v. United States,10 and
Methanex v. United States," have generated considerable criticism from
NAFTA member governments and non-governmental organizations con-
cerned with national sovereignty, the erosion of democratic governance,
and environmental and labor protections. 12
Consequently, the NAFTA parties reacted, both to public pressure and
anticipated NAFTA litigation, by attempting to narrow the scope of state
liability. The states issued an "interpretation" of NAFTA Article 1105
that applies international customary law to limit the scope of "fair and
equitable treatment"'13 under international law. 14 This is contrary to Ar-
ticle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which states
that custom is only one of four sources of international law; therefore, the
scope of "fair and equitable treatment" should be broader than the states'
interpretation.
In addition, the state parties have argued that NAFTA Chapter 11's
nationalization and expropriation provisions should not afford coverage
for indirect or "creeping" expropriation-namely, when reasonable gov-
ernment regulation, including environmental regulation reduces the value
of a foreign investor's property interest. Still, the NAFTA governments
have struggled to find a balance between foreign investment protections
and valid governmental or administrative regulations.
Although Chile FTA Chapter 10 is modeled after NAFTA Chapter 11,
Chapter 10 investor-state dispute resolution attempts to address the ma-
jor concerns voiced about NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution by pro-
viding more "transparency, public input into the dispute settlement,
mechanisms to improve the investor-state process by eliminating frivo-
lous claims," and the possibility of establishing a future appellate mecha-
nism to review arbitral awards under the agreement.15
6. NAFTA Claims, The Disputes: Pleadings, Orders & Awards, http://www.nafta
claims.com/disputes.htm.
7. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/
Metalclad/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf.
8. See generally S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001).
9. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347 (2002).
10. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003).
11. Methanex v. United States, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Aug. 7, 2002)) http://naftaclaims.
com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexFinalAward.pdf.
12. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA
to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 686
(2004).
13. See discussion of "fair and equitable treatment" infra. Foreign investors should
not lack the protection and security afforded to nationals, and should not, in com-
parison with nationals, be put at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining permits
or authorizations necessary to conduct business operations in the state concerned.
14. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1105(1).
15. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R. Rep.
No. 108-224, pt. I, at 3 (2003) [hereinafter Chile FTA Implementation Act].
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Whether Chapter 10 dispute resolution will generate similar criticisms
as NAFTA Chapter 11, of course, remains to be seen. For now, one must
consider how and to what extent the Chapter 10 text differs from or ex-
pands upon investor-state arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. Part I
of this article will review the origin of NAFTA Chapter 11. Although
NAFTA was the first major free trade agreement between developing
and developed countries, most of the key language regarding the defini-
tion of investment and investors, national treatment, fair and equitable
treatment, expropriation, and the requirement for binding international
arbitration of investment disputes generally derives from over forty U.S.
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded since the early 1980s. 16
Part II discusses NAFTA Chapter 11 with emphasis on Article 1105,
the "minimum standard of treatment," and Article 1110, "expropriation."
These provisions have generally been the most difficult for NAFTA arbi-
trators to apply and interpret.1 7
Part III will analyze Chile FTA Chapter 10's "fair and equitable treat-
ment," and "expropriation" standards, commenting on the rationale be-
hind the open investment provisions and the reasons for some exceptions
to the open regime.
Part IV will then examine select articles of the Chapter 10 investor-
state dispute resolution process in detail and compare it to NAFTA
Chapter 11. Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") between developed and
developing countries are now more common, so it is logical to look to
NAFTA for lessons as the United States pursues FTAs with several de-
veloping (and developed) countries. Indeed, the Chile FTA was intended
to be a bellwether for future FTAs in Latin America and simultaneously
provide an incentive for countries in the hemisphere to continue Free
Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA") negotiations.18 Finally, Part V
speculates on the extent to which the changes in Chapter 10 of the Chile
FTA might affect the results of future foreign investment disputes. Chap-
ter 10 solidifies the applicability of international law to foreign invest-
ment disputes, providing greater transparency to the international
arbitration process between private individuals and sovereign entities.
Chapter 10 of the Chile FTA is evidence that investment dispute resolu-
tion based on principles of international law belong in FTAs in the
16. For additional information on BITs, see K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment
Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 105, 112-129 (1986).
17. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 692.
18. In December of 1994, thirty-four democratic countries met in Miami, Florida at
the Summit of the Americas, with the goal of fashioning the FTAA. See FTAA,
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp and Summit of the Americas, http://www.
summit-americas.org. See also Sidney Weintraub, Lessons from the Chile and Sin-
gapore Free Trade Agreements, in Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Strategies and
Priorities 79 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) [hereinafter Weintraub, Free Trade
Agreements].
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Americas.19
II. THE ORIGINS OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11
NAFTA broke new ground with Chapter 11, the investor-dispute reso-
lution mechanism. Indeed, the NAFTA state parties waived sovereign
immunity for private party claims to a degree far greater than before,
such as in jurisdictional issues involving the International Court of Jus-
tice.20 The investment provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11, however, are
not completely innovative. Actually, NAFTA Chapter 11 was based in
large part on the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") 21 and
earlier treaties that provided prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion for expropriation as a response to economic nationalists' assertions
that expropriated investors were entitled to no more than the same treat-
ment that states afford its nationals.22 Indeed, the U.S. Model BIT obli-
gates a host state, at the request of the investor, to submit investment
disputes to binding third-party arbitration. In light of this, NAFTA's es-
tablishment of similar arbitral panels, therefore, is not revolutionary.
Specific aspects of NAFTA investor-state arbitration are, nonetheless,
dissimilar to the American Model BIT. For example, the BIT program
typically paired the United States, a developed exporter of capital, with a
developing state that imports capital but exports very little of it. In fact,
prior to the Canada FTA and NAFTA, all of the BITs the United States
entered into were with developing countries, and the Canada FTA incor-
porated neither the "fair and equitable" treatment language nor binding
international arbitration.
Conversely, NAFTA combines comprehensive investment protections
and provision for direct claims as between two States with substantial
capital exchange. Indeed, the bilateral investment relationship between
Canada and the United States is one of the most extensive in the world,
with more than $1.4 billion of trade per day between the two nations.23
The United States is Canada's largest investor at $175 billion, while Ca-
nada's $134 billion trade with the United States ranks seventh.24 Their
well-developed legal systems, with independent judiciaries, provide a
19. See Scott R. Jablonski, iSi Po! Foreign Investment Dispute Resolution Does Have a
Place in Trade Agreements in the Americas: A Comparative Look at Chapter 10 of
the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
627, 631 (2004). Recently, the United States has negotiated bilateral FTA's with
the five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR),
Peru (PTPA) and Colombia (CTPA). In addition, the US Trade Representative
opened talks with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Panama in 2004. Uruguay, moreover,
signed a BIT with the United States.
20. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 685.
21. 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, http://ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/
Investment/ModelBIT/asset-upload file847_6897.pdf.
22. Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43
HARV. INT'L L. J. 531, 534 (2002) [hereinafter Legum, Investor-State Arbitration].
23. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 697.
24. Id.
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high level of protection for both foreign and domestic investors against
arbitrary actions by the governments.
Direct claims against a member State, therefore, create substantial liti-
gation risks for each treaty partner. 25 Not surprisingly, actions by U.S.
investors against Canada or Canadian investors against the United States
account for roughly sixty percent of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes.
26
Hence, NAFTA is also a departure from the typical BIT scenario. 27 The
distinction between NAFTA Chapter 11 and the Model BIT is important.
Even though the Model BIT provisions are reciprocal, 28 the litigation risk
is not: the developed State will not likely face a claim by an investor of a
developing State.
Recently, the United States came close to adopting BIT-type language
for all disputes among major developed countries through the Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment (MAI). 29 Yet the MAI negotiations failed
because U.S. and Canadian government officials were concerned that
BIT investment protection rules provided excessively broad protection to
foreign investors. 30 Had the MAI been adopted, the United States and
Canada would have likely faced several billions worth of North Ameri-
can, European, and Japanese investments claims. 3
1
III. NAFTA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
NAFTA Chapter 11, entitled "Investment," serves two purposes. First,
it provides a set of mandatory substantive provisions, which include, inter
alia, most-favored-nation treatment, performance requirements, national-
ity of senior management, and financial transfers.
Second, NAFTA Chapter 11 provides for binding dispute arbitration
between foreign investors and their host governments under the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitra-
tion rules, the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, or the ICSIDs "Additional Fa-
cility Rules." 32
If a NAFTA arbitral tribunal concludes that a host government has
violated any of its Chapter 11 obligations, the tribunal may require that
government to pay compensation to the foreign-investor complainant. 33
An investor, moreover, may seek enforcement of an arbitration award
under the ICSID, New York, or InterAmerican Conventions.3 4 Although
25. Id. at 685.
26. Id. at 697-98.
27. See Legum, Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 22, at 537.
28. See Chapter 11 of NAFTA, supra note 2 (illustrating that all investment provisions
apply equally to the other party or parties).
29. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Organi[z]ation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm.
30. Id.
31. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 696.
32. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1120.
33. Id. at art. 1135.
34. Id. at art. 1136(6).
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NAFTA Chapter 11 contains a comprehensive set of mandatory substan-
tive provisions, Chapter l's most important and controversial provisions
relate to "fair and equitable treatment" and "expropriation."
A. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Article 1105 states that "each Party shall accord to investments of in-
vestors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. '35
Because the drafters connected the "fair and equitable treatment" and
"full protection and security" standards with "international law," foreign
investors asserting that the state had denied them fair and equitable treat-
ment must demonstrate that the denial was a violation of international
law.36
Unfortunately, there was little guidance regarding the definition of
"fair and equitable treatment." NAFTA itself never defines the precise
meaning of "fair and equitable treatment," and the U.S. Statement of
Administrative Action, which accompanied NAFTA to Congress in 1993,
never mentions Article 1105.37 However, the Canadian Statement on Im-
plementation of NAFTA explained that Article 1105(1) "provides for a
minimum absolute standard of treatment, based on long-standing princi-
ples of customary international law."'38
The difference between "international law" and "customary interna-
tional law" has been a primary source of contention in investor-state arbi-
tration proceedings. Under Article 1105, the term "international law"
suggests a broader scope than "customary international law." For in-
stance, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice de-
fines international law to include: "(a) international conventions, (b)
international custom, (c) the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations, and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations."'39 In other words, cus-
tomary international law is merely a subset of international law.40 Cus-
tomary international law is "created and sustained by the constant and
uniform practice of States," and indicates "the mutual conviction that the
recurrence is the result of a compulsory rule."'41 It is one possible inter-
pretation of the "fair and equitable treatment" language, not the only
definition.
35. Id. at art. 1105(1).
36. See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 Int'l Law 727,
729 (1993).
37. Id.
38. North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Statement on Implementation,
C. Gaz. (Jan. 1, 1994), at 149.
39. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38.
40. Id.
41. See Barry E. Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, & Curtis A. Bradley, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(4th ed. 2003) (1991).
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B. EXPROPRIATION
NAFTA Chapter l's nationalization and expropriation provisions af-
ford protection for foreign investors against effective expropriation, or
"creeping" expropriation. Chapter 11 states:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an in-
vestment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b)
on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of
law and article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in ac-
cordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.42
Still, even under these relatively well-established customary interna-
tional law principles, it is difficult to determine when a government action
that interferes with broadly defined property rights constitutes an illegal,
compensable taking.
C. NAFTA CASE LAW PRIOR TO THE FTC INTERPRETATION
Since NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994, several Chapter 11
tribunals have considered the scope of Article 1105 "minimum standard
of treatment" and Article 1110 "expropriation." Although "[a]n award
made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the dis-
puting parties and in respect of a particular case," prior decisions may
have persuasive authority.43 Consequently, it is important to examine
NAFTA case law. In particular, decisions in cases such as Metalclad, S.D.
Myers, Pope & Talbot, Loewen and Methanex have influenced the revised
language concerning investors rights provided under Chapter 10 of the
Chile FTA.
In Metalclad v. United Mexican States,44 Metalclad, a Delaware com-
pany, claimed that a Mexican municipality's denial of a construction li-
cense based on environmental grounds violated NAFTA Articles 1105
"fair and equitable treatment standard" and 1110 "expropriation. ' 45
COTERIN, Metalclad's wholly owned subsidiary, received authorization
from the Mexican federal government to construct a hazardous waste
landfill located in Guadalcazar, San Luis Potosf.46 Soon thereafter, the
Governor of San Luis Potosf began a public campaign to oppose the land-
fill. The municipality of Guadalcazar ordered Metalclad to stop construc-
tion, citing Metalclad's lack of a municipal permit.47 Metalclad applied
for a permit and reaffirmed its belief that federal officials had already
42. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1110.
43. Id. at art. 1136(1).
44. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/
Metalclad/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf.
45. Id. at 37.
46. Id. at 41.
47. Id. at 42.
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authorized the landfill's construction. 48 Metalclad relied on the federal
government's assurances that no state or municipal permits were re-
quired. Immediately upon the landfill's completion, however, demonstra-
tors and state troopers blocked traffic to and from the site, effectively
preventing operation of the landfill.49
Subsequently, Guadalcazar denied Metalclad's application for a munic-
ipal permit on environmental grounds.50 After Metalclad initiated Chap-
ter 11 proceedings against Mexico, the governor of San Luis Potosf issued
an ecological decree to protect rare cactus and declared the landfill a
"natural area."'51
The arbitral tribunal held that Mexico's failure to provide a transparent
regulatory system denied Metalclad fair and equitable treatment in accor-
dance with international law, as required by Article 1105. 52 The tribunal
stated that NAFTA's "fair and equitable treatment" language, combined
with its underlying objectives to promote and increase cross-border in-
vestment opportunities and ensure the successful implementation of in-
vestment initiatives, 53 required all relevant legal requirements for
initiating, completing, and successfully operating investments made, or in-
tended to be made under the Agreement, to be transparent. 54
In this case, Metalclad had relied on the Mexican federal government's
assurances that it had followed all necessary requirements and proce-
dures to construct and operate the landfill. Mexico. however, failed to
notify Metalclad of the requisite municipal permit. Consequently, Mex-
ico failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework in order for
Metalclad to properly plan its business and investment, amounting to a
violation of Article 1105.55
Additionally, the tribunal found that Mexico violated Article 1110 be-
cause the municipality s action "effectively and unlawfully prevented
[Metalclad's] operation of the landfill." ' 6 The Governor, in his final ef-
fort to block the hazardous waste landfill, declared the concession area
part of an "ecological preserve." This official action effectively barred
the landfill's operation permanently, thus rendering Metalclad's invest-
ment worthless.
In holding that the expropriation was indirect, the tribunal may have
added an unnecessary level of complexity to the determination of expro-
priation. Instead of simply characterizing the Governor's actions as di-
rect interference that resulted in expropriation, the tribunal characterized
48. Id.
49. Id. at 43.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 44.
52. Id. at 50.
53. See NAF-A. supra note 2. at art. 102(1).
54. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.). ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes Mexico/
MetalcladlMetalcladFinalAward.pdf.
55. Id. at 50.
56. Id.
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the rezoning as an indirect act that effectively expropriated the investor's
property by rendering it worthless. In other words, the tribunal broadly
defined Article 1110 to protect against both actual and effective forms of
expropriation. 57
The Metalclad tribunal's broad interpretation of Article 1105's "fair
and equitable treatment" distressed the NAFTA parties. Indeed, the
Metalclad tribunal had expanded the scope of Article 1105's investment
protections and potentially exposed the member governments to exces-
sive amounts of investment claims. There is no explicit obligation to pro-
vide transparency to investors under Article 1105(A). General NAFTA
obligations with respect to transparency are only found in Chapter 18.58
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,59 S.D. Myers, an Ohio company en-
gaged in remediation of hazardous waste, alleged that Canada's export
ban of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste denied it fair and equitable
treatment under Article 1105 and was enacted to benefit Chem-Securi-
ties, Canada's only PCB treatment facility located in Alberta, Canada. 60
S.D. Myers entered the Canadian market to obtain PCB waste for treat-
ment in Ohio. S.D. Myers enjoyed a significant cost advantage over
Chem-Securities: it was cheaper for Ontario PCB producers to ship their
waste a few hundred miles to Ohio rather than 1,500 miles to Alberta. In
1995, however, the Canadian Minister of the Environment issued interim
and final orders that temporarily banned PCB exports from Canada. Ca-
nadian companies had to treat their PCB wastes at Chem-Securities.
S.D. Myers also charged that the export ban of hazardous waste to the
firm's treatment facilities in the United States was "tantamount to expro-
priation. '61 Indeed, as demonstrated in Metalclad under international
law, expropriation can be actual or effective. As such, Canada's ban on
PCB waste exports effectively excluded S.D. Myers from the Canadian
PCB waste treatment market. 62
Canada argued, however, that the ban was enacted in order to comply
with the Basel Convention, an international environmental agreement
57. Gantz, supra note 12, at 736. Shortly thereafter, the British Columbia Supreme
Court (a trial court) reviewed and reversed parts of the Metalclad award. The
International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA), a British Columbia statute,
granted the BCSC jurisdiction to review the arbitral tribunal's award because Van-
couver, British Columbia had served as the seat of the arbitration. The BCSC held
that NAFTA Article 102(1)'s transparency principle was not an actionable obliga-
tion under Chapter 11: the tribunal exceeded the scope of investor-State arbitra-
tion by combining "transparency" and "fair and equitable treatment."
Accordingly, it reversed the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropria-
tion violations based on denial of transparency. See United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R. 3d 359 (Can.). Note, however, that the BCSC
did not hold that Mexico provided Metalclad with "fair and equitable treatment:"
only that transparency requirement is not an element to be considered in an Arti-
cle 1105 analysis.
58. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at arts. 1801-04.
59. S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001).
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developed under the auspices of the United Nations Environment
Programme. 63
The tribunal held that because the "[m]inimum [s]tandard of
[t]reatment" encompasses the international law requirements of due pro-
cess, economic rights, and obligations of good faith and natural justice,64
Canada had violated Article 1105 through blatant discrimination with its
hazardous waste processing facility in Alberta and in S.D. Myers's similar
facility in Ohio.65 The tribunal asserted that Article 1105(1)'s "fair and
equitable treatment," and "full protection and security" language must be
read in conjunction with the introductory phrase "treatment in accor-
dance with international law."'66 Consequently, an Article 1105 breach
occurs only "when... an investor has been treated in such an unjust or
arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable
from the international perspective. ' 67 Discriminatory and unfair treat-
ment is also a denial of good faith under Article 1105 as foreign investors
should not lack the protection and security afforded to nationals.68
Thus, it is clear that the S.D. Myers tribunal broadly interpreted the
"fair and equitable treatment" standards under Article 1105 in favor of
foreign investors.69 At the same time, the arbitral tribunal rejected S.D.
Myers' expropriation claim. 70 The tribunal stated that "expropriation" is
considered a permanent interference with ownership and economic rights
rather than the "lesser interference" of government regulation. 71 Ca-
nada's interference in S.D. Myers' business was temporary and therefore
did not violate Article 1110.72
In Pope & Talbot,73 a U.S. corporation alleged that Canada's enact-
ment of an export quota system under the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agree-
ment with the United States discriminated against its Canadian subsidiary
in violation of Article 1105's "minimum standard of treatment" clause.74
Additionally, Pope & Talbot argued that the Article 1110 standard of
protection was according to international law, not merely "customary"
63. The Basel Convention prohibits the export and import of hazardous wastes to and
from states that are not party to the Agreement. At the time the United States
had signed but not ratified the Convention.
64. See S.D. Myers, 40 I.L.M. at 1481.
65. See Id. at 1448-50.
66. Id. at 1438.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. Fair and equitable treatment is subsumed in the international law standard:
since international law includes rules designed to protect investors, a denial of na-
tional treatment under Article 1102 can also be violation of Article 1105, as it was
in this case. Id.
70. Id. at 1440.
71. Id. ("An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an
owner to make use of its economic rights.
72. Id.
73. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001). http://www.
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf.
74. See Id. 106.
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international law. 75 Accordingly, "tantamount to expropriation" means
indirect expropriation, including all "non-discriminatory measures of gen-
eral application" 76  which substantially interfere with foreign
investments.77
Canada asserted, however, that according to international law, an Arti-
cle 1105 minimum treatment standard violation required "egregious"
state conduct. 78 Canada's enactment of a lumber export control regime
merely reallocated quotas among Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario,
and Quebec and reduced Pope & Talbot's exports to the United States.79
Canada argued, therefore, that its actions did not rise to the level of
,egregious" conduct under international law.80
Additionally, Canada argued that "mere interference is not expropria-
tion; rather, a significant degree of deprivation of fundamental rights of
ownership is required." 8' Indeed, the term "tantamount" simply meant
"equivalent," and, therefore, did not expand Article 1110's scope to cover
governmental regulatory action.8 2
The arbitral tribunal held that Canada's Softwood Lumber Division of
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SLD) failed
to provide Pope & Talbot's investment fair and equitable treatment. 83
The tribunal also held that the NAFTA right to "fair and equitable treat-
ment" was independent of, rather than limited by, the phrase "treatment
in accordance with international law." 84
The tribunal also rejected Canada's more narrow interpretation of Ar-
ticle 1110 and partially accepted Pope & Talbot's broader interpretation
that indirect expropriation includes all non-discriminatory measures that
substantially interfere with investments of investors of NAFTA parties.8 5
The tribunal, nonetheless, ultimately found that Canada did not violate
Article 1110.86 Canada's export quota system did not "substantial[ly]"
deprive Pope & Talbot of its investment. 87
75. See id. 107, 112, 113.
76. Article 1110 states: "No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate
an investment of an investor of another Party... or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation") except...
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis .. " NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1110.
77. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 1 at 104 (June 26, 2000), http://
www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopelnterimMeritsAward.pdf. For
further discussion on the merits of the Article 1110 claim, See id. 96-104.
78. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 73, 108. The "thresh-
old" of the government conduct at issue requires "gross misconduct, manifest in-
justice or... an outrage, bad faith, or the willful neglect of duty." Id. 108 n.93
(internal citation omitted).
79. Id. 20-21, 92-94, 121.
80. See Id. 1$ 108-09.
81. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 1, supra note 77, 87-88.
82. Id. at 89.
83. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 73, at 181.
84. Id. at $ 111.
85. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 1, supra note 77, at 96.
86. Id. at 9$ 96, 105.
87. Id. at J 96.
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D. THE FTC INTERPRETATION AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE
CHAPTER 11 TRIBUNALS
NAFTA Article 1131(2) permits the trade ministers from each party,
acting as the Free Trade Commission (FTC), to issue interpretations of
NAFTA, which is binding on Chapter 11 tribunals. 88 After the Pope &
Talbot tribunal held that Canada breached Article 1105, the NAFTA gov-
ernments issued their first, and, to date, only NAFTA Chapter 11 "Inter-
pretation" to narrow the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" to what
customary international law provides.8 9 This Interpretation of Article
1105(1) states the following:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with Interna-
tional Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments
of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "'full pro-
tection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another pro-
vision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agree-
ment, does not establish that there has been a breach of
Article 1105(1).90
The "customary international law" standard under Section B(1), as op-
posed to Article 1105's "international law" language, substantially limits
Chapter 11 investment protection provisions.91 Simply put, the Interpre-
tation does not require that the concepts of "fair and equitable treat-
ment" and "full protection and security" be ignored, but rather that they
be subsumed in the minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
Section B(2) effectively overrules the then pending Pope & Talbot
award, clarifying that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection
and security" are afforded only to the extent required by customary inter-
national law. 92 Finally, in response to the S.D. Myers holding that Ca-
nada had violated the minimum standard of treatment provisions of
Article 1105 through blatant discrimination between its hazardous waste
processing facility in Alberta and S.D. Myers' similar facility in Ohio, 93
paragraph 3 prohibited a claimant from basing an Article 1105 violation
largely on a finding of an Article 1102 national treatment violation.
88. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1131(2).
89. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions § B (July 31, 2001), http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTAComm-
1105_Transparency.pdf.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See Id.
92. See Id.
93. S.D. Myers, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1438-39, J$ 263-69.
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The FTC Interpretation, however, immediately sparked controversy.
The Pope & Talbot tribunal suggested that the parties' interpretation was
actually a back-door effort to amend NAFTA without the approval of
each party's constitutional processes. 94 Indeed, the FTC had effectively
amended Article 1105(1) by inserting the word "customary" before "in-
ternational law," thus limiting the scope of Article 1105 protections. The
United States defended the Interpretation and criticized the Pope & Tal-
bot tribunal by arguing that treaty law and arbitral decisions were not
relevant in determining "customary international law" unless there was
evidence of a general practice and agreement in the literature or prior
court cases. As noted previously, Canada urged the Pope & Talbot tribu-
nal to award damages pursuant to a violation of customary international
law only if the tribunal found Canada acted egregiously or otherwise
failed to meet internationally required standards. 95
In the end, the Pope & Talbot tribunal held that the Interpretation was
binding, but it refused to accept the static version of customary law ad-
vanced by Canada and the other parties.96 Instead, the tribunal believed
that the range of actions subject to international concern included the
concept of fair and equitable treatment, 97 which was recognized by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 98
and was central to the 1,800 BITs negotiated to protect foreign-owned
property.99 This clearly evidenced state practice towards the formation of
customary international law. 100 The tribunal, nevertheless, did not decide
the applicable customary international law standard because Canada's
Softwood Lumber division violated Article 1105 by treating Pope & Tal-
bot in an egregious manner.10 1
Several subsequent Chapter 11 tribunals have struggled with these
same issues. In fact, many have backed away from the idea that the Inter-
pretation was an attempt not to interpret, but to amend indirectly,
NAFTA. Consequently, Loewen,'0 2 and Methanex,10 3 both post-Inter-
pretation cases, have great importance in terms of shaping government
and public policy with regard to Chapter 11 and the application of the
FTC Interpretation.
The facts leading up to Loewen are as follows. O'Keefe, an owner of
several funeral homes and Gulf National Funeral Insurance Company,
sued Loewen, a Canadian funeral home conglomerate, in Mississippi
state court for breach of contract and related claims. 10 4 O'Keefe's attor-
94. Pope & Talbot, 41 I.L.M. 1347 at 47 (2002).
95. Id. at 108.
96. Id. at 110.
97. Id. at 109.
98. Id. at 112.
99. Id. at ill.
100. Id. at 111.
101. Id. at 181.
102. Loewen, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003).
103. Methanex, supra note 11.
104. Loewen, supra note 102, at 812.
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ney, Willie Gary, however, spent little time addressing the intricacies of
tort or contract law during the trial. Instead, Gary targeted three main
issues: (1) Ray Loewen's nationality; (2) his purported racism and deceit-
fulness; and (3) his wealth. 10 5 The Gary team also compared the dispute
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 0 6 and to alleged unfair trade
practices by Canadian farmers. 10 7 Judge Graves, moreover, "repeatedly
allowed Gary to make irrelevant and highly prejudicial com-
ments ... [that] inflamed the passion of the jury and ultimately produced a
grossly excessive verdict." 10 8
The jury returned a verdict of $500 million, of which $400 million rep-
resented punitive damages, even though the disputed contracts were
worth less than ten million dollars. 10 9 Following the proceedings, the jury
foreman publicly stated that Ray Loewen "was a rich, dumb Canadian
politician who thought he could come down and pull the wool over the
eyes of a good ole Mississippi boy. It didn't work."' 10
Loewen subsequently brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the
United States. He argued that Article 1105(1) and the Interpretation
prescribe the customary international law standard of treatment of aliens
as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to the investment
property of nationals of the other party. The introduction of anti-Cana-
dian testimony and counsel comments during the trial was prejudicial and
violated the "fair and equitable treatment" standard.11 Loewen argued,
"under international law, an alien is entitled to an impartial trial un-
tainted by invidious discrimination."' 12 In addition, the excessive verdict
allegedly violated Article 1110.113
The Loewen tribunal, however, stated that there could only be an ex-
propriation violation if Loewen demonstrated a denial of justice under
Article 1105.114 However, the Loewen tribunal agreed that the Missis-
sippi court decision was "clearly improper and discreditable and cannot
be squared with minimum standards of international law and fair and eq-
uitable treatment."115 Yet, the tribunal added: "no instance has been
drawn to our attention in which an international tribunal has held a State
responsible for a breach of international law constituted by a lower court
decision when there was available an effective and adequate appeal
105. See generally Notice of Claim, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Oct. 30, 1998),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3922.pdf.
106. Id. at 103.
107. Id. at 1 100.
108. Id. at T1 40.
109. Id. J[ 117.
110. Id. 143.
111. Id. 91 144.
112. Id. 91 141.
113. Id. 167.
114. Id. 91 145.
115. Proc. between Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Lowen & U.S, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/98/3, T 142 (2003).
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within the State's legal system."' 6 In other words, a NAFTA Chapter 11
tribunal cannot find a violation of international law unless local legal
remedies have been exhausted (the finality requirement via exhaustion of
domestic judicial remedies).11 7
Notwithstanding the fact that NAFTA has an election, not an exhaus-
tion requirement, 1 8 the NAFTA parties must have been relieved by the
Loewen tribunal's holding because NAFTA negotiators probably never
intended for domestic courts to be subject to NAFTA actionable
claims,11 9 which would effectively subject domestic judicial decisions to
review by international tribunals. Indeed, many Americans would likely
find this troubling. Allowing foreign investors to challenge judicial deci-
sions under Chapter 11 would give foreign investors greater rights than
domestic investors, whose only recourse is the domestic legal system. 120
In Methanex v. United States,12 1 Methanex, a Canadian producer and
marketer of methanol, alleged that California's ban of the gasoline addi-
tive, methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), constituted "unfair and inequi-
table treatment" and was "tantamount to expropriation. ' 122 In 1997, the
California legislature passed the MTBE Public Health and Environmen-
tal Protection Act, which authorized a study of MTBE's effects. The Uni-
versity of California at Davis conducted the study and determined that,
although MTBE was not conclusively a human carcinogen, "it did cause
significant risks and costs to water contamination."' 123 Based on this
study and growing public concern, Governor Davis issued an executive
order for the phase-out of MTBE. The ban, therefore, effectively ex-
cluded Methanex from the California market.
Methanex asserted that the FTC Interpretation binds the parties if and
only if it is not an amendment of Article 1105(1).124 Methanex recog-
nized the FTC's ability to issue binding interpretations of NAFTA provi-
sions125 but asserted that it lacks the power to amend NAFTA.
116. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT & CHRISTOPHER J. GREENWOOD, INTERNATIONAL LAW RE-
PORTS, 397 (2007).
117. The tribunal incorrectly held that under the exhaustion requirement, Loewen was
required to appeal to the United States Supreme Court before the NAFTA arbi-
tral panel had jurisdiction. A foreign investor must only waive his right to "initiate
or continue" domestic court proceedings prior to initiating NAFTA arbitration.
118. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1121.
119. Stefan Matiation, Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free
Trade Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 U. PA. INT'L
ECON. L. 451, 468 (2003).
120. Id. at 461.




124. Claimant Methanex Corp. Reply to the Response of Respondent United States of
October 26, 2001 to Methanex's Submission Concerning the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission's July 31, 2001 Interpretation at 2, Methanex Corp. v. United States
(Nov. 9, 2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanexnves-
torSecondSubRell05.pdf, [hereinafter Methanex Reply Submission].
125. See NAFTA, supra note 2 at 1121(2).
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Consequently, any interpretation limiting the scope of investment protec-
tion, including the interpretation suggested by the United States, would
be an impermissible amendment. 126 Methanex argued, therefore, that
the tribunal must interpret Article 1105's "fair and equitable treatment"
provision in accordance with its ordinary meaning. 127
In support of its proposition, Methanex cited rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, NAFTA jurisprudence, international law, and domestic law. First,
Methanex asserted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
required the tribunal to interpret Chapter 11 in light of its purpose, which
is to provide investment protection. Therefore, the words "fair and equi-
table treatment" should be interpreted by their plain meaning. 128 Sec-
ond, Methanex contended that the Loewen tribunal had previously ruled
that "Chapter 11 should be given a liberal interpretation" in order to pro-
vide investment protection.1 29
Third, Methanex rejected the United States' argument that the defini-
tion of fair and equitable treatment is too "unknown" or "subjective" to
be given its ordinary meaning. Methanex asserted that the definition of
"fair and equitable treatment" is well known in both international and
domestic law. 130
While the fair and equitable treatment standard may not be reduci-
ble to a single formulation applicable to every set of circumstances,
the standard is routinely applied by international and U.S. judges in
a variety of different contexts. There is no reason why this tribunal
cannot apply the same standard to the California measures.13 '
Finally, Methanex argued that the text of NAFTA must be given its
ordinary meaning: "international law" under Article 1105 must be read
expansively to include both customary and treaty law. 132
The United States, however, asserted that the Interpretation negated
Methanex's arguments based on Article 1105(1); 133 the scope of "custom-
ary international law" as defined in the interpretation was consistent with
"thirty years of state practice." 134 The United States also argued that
"fair and equitable treatment" did not encompass broad concepts of "eq-
uity, fairness, due process and appropriate protection.' 1 35 Finally, the
126. See Methanex Reply Submission, supra note 124 at 2.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id.; See also International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M., 811 (June 26, 2003).
130. Methanex First Submission Re: NAFTA FTC Statement on Article 1105 at 4,
Methanex Corp. v. United States, (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5823.
htm.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id.
133. Response of Respondent United States of America to Methanex's Submission
Concerning the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's July 31, 2001 Interpretation at
1, Methanex Corp. v. United States (Oct. 26, 2001), http:// www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/6028.pdf.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 6.
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United States argued that Article 1105 did not permit claims "based on
violations of WTO or other conventional international obligations." 136
The tribunal rejected all of Methanex's Chapter 11 substantive claims,
including those based on Article 1105(1). The tribunal applied the FTC
Interpretation's restrictive "fair and equitable treatment" standard and
held that the United States did not violate Article 1105.137 Although ear-
lier cases indicated an increasingly expansive view of NAFTA's invest-
ment protection provisions, the Interpretation directs Chapter 11 arbitral
tribunals to narrow the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" to what
customary international law provides. 138 Even if the FTC Interpretation
was a substantive change, "[a] treaty may be amended by agreement be-
tween the parties,"139 and "any subsequent agreement between the par-
ties regarding the interpretation of a treaty or the application of its
provisions" 140 shall be taken into account.
The tribunal also held that California's ban was a permissive regula-
tion-a non-discriminatory action, for a public purpose, in accordance
with due process of law, and fair and equitable treatment-and not an
expropriation. 141 Methanex entered the US market aware that govern-
ment environmental and health protection institutions "continuously
monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly
prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for environ-
mental and/or health reasons."' 142
IV. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF CHILE FTA CHAPTER 10
The Chile FTA Chapter 10 text attempts to address the major concerns
surrounding NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution. Like NAFTA Chap-
ter 11, Section A of Chapter 10 provides substantive obligations that the
parties must follow with respect to foreign investments. These provisions
stand to promote an open investment policy between Chile and the
United States. Chapter 10, however, explicitly incorporates the NAFTA
parties' FTC Interpretation narrowing the scope of Chile FTA Chapter 10
investor-state arbitration. This section will discuss Chapter 10's "fair and
equitable treatment" and "expropriation" provisions.
The main purpose of Chile FTA Chapter 10 is to "ensure a predictable,
commercial framework for business planning and investment"'143 and to
"substantially increase investment opportunities in the territories of the
136. Id. at 8.
137. Methanex v. United States Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV, Chap-
ter C, 27, (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.
pdf.
138. Id. 9-10 (Discrimination between nationals and aliens contravenes customary
international law only by way of exception-Methanex failed to establish that a
specific customary rule required equal treatment under the circumstances).
139. Id. 21.
140. Id.
141. Id. at Part IV, Chapter D, . 9-10.
142. Id.
143. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at preamble.
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Parties."'1 44 Chapter 10 sets forth "fair and equitable treatment" and "ex-
propriation" standards for the protection of investors and investments. 145
A. ARTICLE 10.4: MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT
Compared to NAFTA Article 1105, Chile FTA Article 10.4 provides
more detail "with respect to the standards of treatment of aliens and their
property found in customary international law."' 146 The United States
and Chile structured 10.4(1) to ensure the applicability of "customary in-
ternational law," rather than "international law." Article 10.4(1) requires
that the parties "accord to covered investments treatment in accordance
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security."'1 47
Similarly, the parties clarified that "fair and equitable treatment" and
"full protection and security" are not additive to the requirement of com-
pliance with customary international law, but rather are subsumed in that
concept. 148 "Fair and equitable treatment" is not limited to avoiding a
denial of justice and the concept of due process embodied in the world's
principle legal systems. 149
Chile FTA Article 10.4(2) avoids reducing "fair and equitable treat-
ment" to no more than non-discriminatory treatment, where national
treatment does not meet minimum standards of customary international
law.150 Indeed, a "minimum standard" provision is necessary to avoid
harsh, injurious, and unjust treatment to foreign investors, even if a gov-
ernment did not act in a discriminatory manner. 151 Article 10.4(2) also
equates fair and equitable treatment under customary international law
with U.S. standards of due process, so the former is not broader than the
latter.152
144. Id. at art. 1.2(1)(d).
145. Id. at art. 10.4.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. 10.4(1).
148. Id. art. 10.4(2).
149. Id. at art. 10.4(2)(a). The "principal legal systems of the world" language is con-
trary to the United States' argument in the Methanex case (fair and equitable
treatment does not include broad concepts of "equity, fairness, due process, and
appropriate protection"). See Methanex v. United States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., (Aug.
7, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1213pdf. If, however, the
principal legal systems of the world use concepts of equity and fairness to define
"fair and equitable treatment," then it is difficult to argue that those concepts are
irrelevant in defining the substance of customary international law. See Gantz,
supra note 12, at 726. The due process language advocates the United States' posi-
tion in the Loewen case (customary international law does not require the United
States to provide a perfect justice system only one that is "fundamentally
adequate").
150. See 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(E) (2002) (trade negotiating objective seeking to estab-
lish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with United States legal
principles and practice including due process).
151. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, May 31, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1347.
152. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, July 26, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 811.
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Additionally, Chile FTA Article 10.4(3) essentially adopts paragraph
three of the FTC Interpretation. "[A] determination that there has been
a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate interna-
tional agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this
Article."'1 53 Article 10.4(3), therefore, eliminates the holding of S.D. My-
ers, which based a NAFTA Article 1102 violation on finding an Article
1105 "fair and equitable treatment" violation. 154 Article 10.4(3) also pre-
vents the Metalclad tribunal's use of a NAFTA Article 1105 violation to
support a finding of indirect expropriation under Article 1110.155
Finally, Chapter 10 defines customary international law: 156 the Parties
confirm their shared understanding that "customary international law"
generally and as specifically referenced in Articles 10.4 and 10.9 results
from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a
sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article 10.4, all customary inter-
national law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of
aliens are being referenced in the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens. 157
The Chile FTA, however, does not address the current scope of cus-
tomary international law. Consequently, the United States only incorpo-
rated due process into the "fair and equitable treatment" standard, and
no more.
158
B. ARTICLE 10.9: EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION
Chile FTA Article 10.9 addresses the concerns expressed by govern-
ments and environmental groups regarding the distinction between com-
pensable expropriation and valid regulation. Chile FTA Article 10.9
provides:
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment ei-
ther directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation
or nationalization except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discrimi-
natory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, and 4; and (d) in
accordance with due process of law and Articles 10.4(1) through (3).159
Article 10.9 substitutes NAFTA's "equivalent to expropriation or na-
tionalization" language with "tantamount to nationalization or expropria-
tion.' 160 The significance of this language change, however, is not
substantive. The S.D. Myers tribunal suggested that the terms "tanta-
153. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.4(3).
154. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (Nov. 12, 2000).
155. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (Aug. 30, 2000).
156. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at Annex 10-A.
157. Id.
158. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 727.
159. See art. 10.9 of Chile FTA, supra note 1.
160. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 743.
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mount" and "equivalent" were functionally the same. 161
Actually, the Chile FTA provisions with the most significant changes
related to expropriation appear in Annex 10-D. First, Annex 10-D pro-
vides that Article 10.9 not go beyond customary international law for in-
vestment protection. 162 Second, Annex 10-D limits expropriation claims
to interference with tangible or intangible property rights. 163 Conse-
quently, Annex 10-D may exclude from coverage trade based claims, in-
cluding those in Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers.164
Third, "indirect expropriation claims are highly circumscribed. ' 165 An-
nex 10-D(4) stresses the need for the "equivalency" of indirect takings to
direct takings, absent only the formal transfer of title or outright
seizure. 166 Accordingly, a case-by-case approach is necessary to deter-
mine whether government interference is reasonable. Factors to consider
include the economic impact of the government action. Even though an
action by a party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an in-
vestment, this effect by itself does not establish that an indirect expropri-
ation has occurred.1 67 "[T]he extent to which the government action
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations"1 68
and "the character of the government action" are also considered. 169
Finally, Chile FTA Annex 10-D states that non-discriminatory actions
protecting "legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment" are not actionable expropriations "[e]xcept
in rare circumstances." 170 Consider the Methanex case; California's
MTBE ban would not be an actionable expropriation because it is a non-
discriminatory action, for a public purpose, in accordance with due pro-
cess of law, and fair and equitable treatment.
V. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A COMPARATIVE LOOK
The Chile FTA Chapter 10 dispute resolution provides more trans-
parency, "public input into the dispute settlement, mechanisms to im-
prove the investor-state process by eliminating frivolous claims," and the
possibility of establishing a future appellate mechanism to review arbitral
awards under the agreement. 171
FTAs between developed and developing countries have increased in
popularity. Consequently, it is logical to look to NAFTA for lessons as
161. Id. The Spanish language version of the Chile FTA uses the same phrase as the
Spanish language version of NAFTA Chapter 11, "equivalente a la expropiaci6n."
See Chile FrA, supra note 1. See also NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1110.
162. Id. at Annex 10-D.
163. Id.
164. See Gantz, supra note 12. at 745.
165. Id.
166. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-D(4).
167. Id. at Annex 10-D(4)(a)(i).
168. Id. at Annex 10-D(4)(a)(ii).
169. Id. at Annex 10-D(4)(a)(iii).
170. Id. at Annex 10-D(4)(b).
171. See Chile FTA Implementation Act, supra note 15.
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the United States negotiates with several developing countries. Indeed,
the Chile FTA was intended to be a bellwether for future FTAs in Latin
America and simultaneously provide an incentive for countries in the
western hemisphere to continue FTAA negotiations.
172
Section B of Chile FTA Chapter 10 details the investment dispute set-
tlement process and several annexes clarify that process. Predictable
rules for the adjudication and enforcement of foreign investors' rights are
critical to achieving an open investment regime. Arbitration provides a
neutral mechanism characterized by private proceedings, flexible proce-
dures, expert decision-makers, relative finality, and enforceability of the
result. A host state will often prefer private adjudication and the poten-
tial for specialized legal expertise within a relaxed procedural framework
to litigation in an investor's home state.
A. ARTICLE 10.15: SUBMISSION OF A CLAIM TO ARBITRATION
Chile FTA article 10.15 grants private investors direct access to an in-
ternational arbitration panel for the resolution of an investment claim
when an investment dispute cannot be settled by consultation and negoti-
ation.173 An investor may submit a claim to arbitration on its own behalf
or on behalf of an enterprise owned or controlled by the investor. 174 A
claim may be based on an alleged breach of "an obligation under Section
A or Annex 10-F," "an investment authorization," or "an investment
agreement," as long as the investor has suffered loss or damage from the
alleged breach. 175 NAFTA Chapter 11, however, never refers to "invest-
ment authorizations" or "investment agreements." Actually, these addi-
tions expanded the scope of Chile FTA arbitration provisions and
NAFTA's governing law clauses.17 6
Other provisions in Article 10.15 detail and limit the arbitration pro-
cess and are identical to those found in NAFTA Chapter 11. For in-
stance, except as permitted under Article 12.18 regarding financial
services, an investor may only utilize Chapter 10 dispute resolution for
alleged breaches of Section A or Annex 10-F.177
Additionally, an investor must provide a party with "written notice of
its intention to submit the claim to arbitration ('notice of intent')" and
specify "the legal and factual basis for each claim" and "the relief sought
and the approximate amount of damages claimed" at least ninety days
172. See Weintraub, supra note 18, at 79. The Chile FTA's importance lies in its prece-
dent setting effect on future FTA's in Latin America. Id. Arguably, however,
Chile FTA's influence on FTAA negotiations has been minimal. Official negotia-
tions have effectively stalled and the FTAA-Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC)
has resorted to informal consultations with delegations of other FTAA countries
since the Miami Ministerial November 20-21, 2003.
173. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15.
174. Id. at art. 10.15(1).
175. Id.
176. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 753.
177. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.15(2).
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before the investor submits the claim to arbitration. 178 An investor,
moreover, must wait six months after the events giving rise to the claim to
submit to Chapter 10 arbitration. 179
Finally, under Article 10.15-as under NAFTA Chapter 11-an inves-
tor may submit a claim to arbitration under ICSID, ICSID Additional
Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL rules.' S0 Unlike NAFTA Chapter 11,
however, Article 10.15 allows the parties to elect "any other arbitration
rules" to govern the dispute. 181
Annex 10-E also grants an investor the opportunity to choose between
the Chapter 10 dispute resolution process and litigating in the parties'
domestic courts.' 82 Annex 10-E prohibits parallel litigation thus eliminat-
ing the possibility that a party will be subject to liability twice for the
same claim; the Annex also rejects the exhaustion requirement. 183 These
provisions are identical to NAFTA Article 1121. But a national court
action is barred only if the parties are identical and if the claimant in the
court action alleges a breach of Section A.18 4 Therefore, if parties allege
the same facts, but contend that these facts show a violation of local law
or of the constitution, then a submission to arbitration pursuant to Chap-
ter 10 would likely be permissible.
B. ARTICLE 10.17: CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON CONSENT
OF EACH PARTY
Article 10.17 establishes a three-year limitation on claims, beginning
the date "on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first ac-
quired, knowledge" of the Article 10 breach. 85 Also, a claim can only be
submitted to arbitration under Chapter 10 with the claimant's written
waiver of any right to initiate or continue suit against the party in any
other court or under any other dispute resolution procedure. 8 6 Conse-
quently, an American investor in Chile may not seek arbitration under
Chapter 10 if she has already alleged the breach of Section A or Annex
10-F in a national court or administrative tribunal. Except for interim
injunctive relief,187 once an action is filed in the national courts, etc., no
waiver is possible.
NAFTA Chapter 11, however, does not prohibit a claimant from filing
a subsequent claim under Chapter 11. The claimant merely relinquishes
178. Id. at art. 10.15(4).
179. Id. at art. 10.15(5).
180. Id. at art. 10.15(a)-(c). See also NAFTA, supra note 2, at art 1120.
181. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.15(d). See also NAFTA, supra note 2, at
art. 1131.
182. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at Annex 10-E.
183. Id. at Annex 10-E.
184. Id. at Annex 10-D.
185. Id. at art. 10.17.
186. Id. at art. 10.17(2).
187. Id. at art. 10.17(3). The investor may seek interim injunctive relief from a domes-
tic court, provided that the action is brought for the sole purpose of preserving the
investor's investment pending the arbitration, rather than monetary damages.
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the right to return to the domestic courts once an arbitral claim is initi-
ated. 188 Annex 10-E's election requirement, compared to NAFTA Chap-
ter 1l's waiver approach, significantly narrows an investor's options.
C. ARTICLE 10.19: CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATION
Article 10.19 establishes a dispute resolution framework that is explic-
itly inclusive and open. Chile FTA Chapter 10 allows parties to choose
where Chapter 10 arbitration will take place, provided that, for enforce-
ment purposes, the place of arbitration is in a country that is a signatory
to the New York Convention. 89 "A non-disputing party may also make
oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding its interpretation"
of Chapter 10 during the course of arbitration. 190
Additionally, unlike NAFTA Chapter 11, the Chile FTA explicitly pro-
vides that a tribunal may "accept and consider amicus curiae submissions
from a person or entity that is not a disputing party."' 91
Chile FTA Chapter 10, compared to NAFTA, also requires tribunals to
decide jurisdictional issues at the outset of the dispute rather than joining
them to the merits. A respondent, therefore, may raise an objection that
a dispute is not within a tribunal's competence. 192 Upon receipt of an
objection, the tribunal must suspend any proceedings on the merits and
consider the objection as a preliminary matter.' 93 Where a request is
made for a decision on an expedited basis, the tribunal must issue a deci-
sion on the objection within 150 days of the request, 160 if there is a
hearing, and 180 if the tribunal shows "extraordinary cause.' ' 94
Additionally, the tribunal may
award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attor-
neys' fees incurred in submitting or opposing the objection. In deter-
mining whether such an award is warranted, the tribunal shall
consider whether either the claimant's claim or the respondent's ob-
jection was frivolous, and shall provide the disputing parties a rea-
sonable opportunity to comment.' 95
Presumably, these provisions eliminate frivolous claims.
A Chapter 10 tribunal, moreover, "may order an interim measure of
protection to preserve the rights of a disputing party, or to ensure that the
188. See NAFFA, supra note 2, at art. 1121(1).
189. Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art.10.19(1). See also NAFTA, supra note 2, at art.
1130.
190. Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.19(2).
191. Id. at art. 10.19(3). The NAFTA FTC, however, recently clarified NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 dispute resolution, noting that nothing in NAFTA precludes a Chapter 11
tribunal from accepting amicus curiae submissions. See Unofficial Statement of
the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation, Oct. 7, 2003,
http//:www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2003/statement-nondisputingpar-
ties.pdf.
192. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.19(4).
193. Id. at art. 10.19(4)(b).
194. Id. at art. 10.19(4)-(5).
195. Id. at art. 10.19(6).
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tribunal's jurisdiction is made fully effective, including an order to pre-
serve evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party" until a
final award is issued.196 A tribunal cannot, however, order attachment or
enjoin the challenged governmental measure. 197 Also, at a disputing
party's request, the tribunal must send a copy of its proposed award to
the disputing and non-disputing parties. Within sixty days, the disputing
parties may submit written comments to the tribunal concerning any as-
pect of the proposed award. 198
Finally, Article 10.19 leaves open the possibility that "a separate multi-
lateral agreement" may establish "an appellate body for purposes of re-
viewing awards rendered by tribunals" and consequently, "the Parties
shall strive to" establish an appellate review mechanism to review deci-
sions rendered by Chapter 10 tribunals under Article 10.25.199 The appel-
late review mechanism's principal purpose is to protect the parties from
the liability of an international arbitration panel. In addition, Article
10.25(6) permits a party to petition domestic courts for review of a final
arbitral award. 200 Annex 10-H gives the parties three years to establish a
Chapter 10 appellate review mechanism.201
NAFTA Chapter 11, however, does not have an appellate review
mechanism-review of NAFTA arbitral decisions are subject to the
courts of the "situs" of the arbitration. Since these reviews will take place
before different courts, in different countries, and under different stan-
dards of review, the desirability of a consistent review process is obvious.
D. ARTICLE 10.20: TRANSPARENCY OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
Chile FTA Chapter 10 has important language regarding transparency
and public access to the arbitral process. Article 10.20 requires that the
notices of intent and arbitration, pleadings, memorials and briefs, minutes
or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, orders, awards, and decisions be
made available to the public. 20 2 Furthermore, a Chapter 10 tribunal
"shall conduct hearings open to the public. ' 20 3 These changes represent a
significant departure from the traditional veil of confidentiality that nor-
196. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.19(8).
197. Id.
198. Id. at art. 10.19(9).
199. Id. at art. 10.19(10).
200. Id. at art. 10.25(6).
201. Id. at Annex 10-H. Interestingly, the Central American-Dominican Republic Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), a post-Chile FTA free trade agreement, provides
more details regarding the development of an appellate mechanism. Once
CAFTA-DR enters fully into force, the [Fair Trade] Commission must within
ninety days initiate a one-year negotiating process to establish an appellate pro-
cess. Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, annex 10-F,
Aug. 5, 2004,http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DRFinalTexts/sectionIndex.html. Whether the CAFTA-DR partners will con-
clude negotiations regarding the appellate mechanism within one year of the
agreement going fully into effect is open to speculation.
202. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.20.
203. Id. at art. 10.20(2).
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mallv surrounds investor-state arbitration. NAFTA does not require
public hearings or the publication of pleadings and awards. 2114 Still. Arti-
cle 10.20 does not require "a respondent to disclose confidential business
information or information that is privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure under a Party's laxw or to furnish or allow access to informa-
tion "'2-' protected under other provisions of the Agreement.
E. ARTICLE 10.21: GOVERNING LAW
Chile FTA Article 10.21(3) clarifies an interpretation's scope as previ-
ouslv explained in NAFTA Article 1131(2). Recall that Article 1131(2)
stated that "An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this
Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Sec-
tion. "'2 6 Article 10.21(3), however, provides that "A decision of the
Commission declaring its interpretation of a provision of this Agreement
under Article 21.1 (Free Trade Commission) shall be binding on a tribu-
nal established under this Section and any award must be consistent with
that decision."" ' -
Also Article 10.21(3) clearly defines the meaning of "'binding"; put sim-
ply. the tribunal must follow the interpretation. Thus, Chile FTA Chap-
ter 10 arbitral tribunals may not encounter the situation the Pope &
Talbot and Methanex tribunals faced, namely. whether the Interpretation
amended NAFTA without the approval of each party's constitutional
processes.
VI. THE CHILE FTA AND FUTURE INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERICAS
To ascertain the United States' opinion with regard to the interpreta-
tion of NAFTA Chapter 11 by arbitral tribunals, look no further than
Chile ETA Chapter 10.208 Chapter 10 investor-state dispute resolution
attempts to address the major concerns voiced about NAETA Chapter 11
dispute resolution by providing "more transparency, public input into the
dispute settlement. mechanisms to improve the investor-state process by
eliminating frivolous claims," and the possibility of establishing a future
appellate mechanism to review arbitral awards under the agreement.20 9
The impact of Chile FTA Chapter 10's new provisions on future invest-
ment arbitrations remains unclear. Nevertheless, Chapter 10 represents
an important step for both Chile and the United States by officially link-
ing the applicability of international law to foreign investment in the
Americas. Chapter 10 limits violations of fair and equitable treatment to
the high standard imposed by customary international laxx. As explained
'04. See NAFTA. supra note 2, at art. 1137.4.
205. Id. at art.10.20(3).
206. See NAFTA. supra note 2. at art. 1131(2).
207. See Chile ETA. supra note 1, at art. 10.21(3).
208. See Gantz. supra note 12. at 763.
209. See Chile FTA Implementation Act. supra note 15.
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earlier, this standard evolves over time and must reflect both treaty law
and the growing jurisprudence of arbitral decisions rendered under Chap-
ter 11.210 Alleged expropriations based on government regulatory action
will also be more difficult for a claimant to prove as reasonable govern-
ment interference is not actionable.
Additionally, Annex 10-A of the Chile FTA, which defines customary
international law, and Annex 10-D, which addresses expropriation and
regulatory takings, will likely be applied retroactively to interpret
NAFTA Chapter 11 (NAFTA does not define these terms) and future
FTAs.
The most important developments in Chapter 10 investor-state arbitra-
tion, however, are found in Articles 10.19 and 10.20. Article 10.19 per-
mits a Chapter 10 tribunal to consider claims based on the merits and
jurisdictional objections separately.211 This provision, with the threat of
payment of costs and attorneys' fees if the moving party is unsuccessful,
may discourage new claims, particularly for claimants without deep
pockets.
The United States and Chile also included provisions in Chapter 10 to
establish a more inclusive, transparent investor-state dispute resolution
process. Article 10.20 permits a Chapter 10 tribunal to "accept and con-
sider" briefs from non-disputing parties, and if requested, a tribunal must
send copies of an award proposal to the disputing parties and the inves-
tor's home country for comments before rendering a final award.212 Fur-
thermore, Article 10.20 provides explicit guidelines for document sharing
during the course of arbitration and requires Chapter 10 investor-state
dispute resolutions to be open to the public. 213
Finally, while the Chile FTA does not establish an official appellate
review mechanism for Chapter 10 awards, the text does allow the parties
to include one if created in the future. 214
210. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 765.
211. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, at art. 10.19.
212. Id. at art. 10.25.
213. Id. at art. 10.20.
214. Id. at Annex 10-H.
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